The center is unique in that it is dedicated exclusively to the study of Iraq and it can offer an historical and interdisciplinary insight into events and developments there.  The center's aim is to provide a variety of research products ranging from position papers to in-depth studies. The Center works as an independent think tank. It will conduct all its research as a team and will offer answers to urgent questions addressed to it. It will offer analyses and policy alternatives, including solutions that may even seem to be improbable or diametrically opposed to conventional wisdom. The Center’s research will include in-depth study of Iraqi politics, society, culture and economy, taking into full account the last eighty years (and in some cases the last few hundred years) of Iraq’s history.

Introduction: the Center’s Raison d’etre
The Need for In-Depth Analysis
How can better analysis help the decision maker?
The Center’s Activities

Introduction: the Center’s Raison d’etre

After 35 years of Ba’thi dictatorship, the harshest in Middle East history, and after over five years of de-facto occupation, Iraq is a boiling cauldron of murderous sectarian and ethnic hate.  Scores of people are being killed daily by suicide bombers, car bombs and death squads. Sunni on Sunni and even more so: Shi’i on Shi’i violence, too, is having its toll. Crime is rampant, the infrastructure is in disrepair, and the economy cannot thrive. Since 2003 some two million Iraqis already left their country, most of them living in poverty in Jordan and Syria, and some two million more are refugees in their own homeland. Many others, according to some assessments eight million, have been impoverished. For a nation of twenty seven million this is verging on a disaster. Since mid-2007 Iraq has been witnessing a limited, yet significant improvement in terms of security and the very beginning of economic recovery, but this improvement is very brittle, and the country is still largely in a state of chaos.

As long as the chaos persists, Iraq will be unable to tap its vast oil reserves that represent between 10 and 15 percent of the world’s total. Only tapping those reserves can finance the colossal  reconstruction effort needed and help bring about stability and later prosperity in Iraq. In addition to the suffering of Iraqis, this crisis threatens also to spill over into Iraq’s neighboring countries. The violent disintegration of Iraq would likely lead to a renewed presence of al-Qa’ida in the Sunni Arab “triangle” that will undermine Jordan’s stability and threaten to spread terrorism much further afield. It will also increase tension between the Kurds and Turkey. Likewise it may lead to dangerous developments in the Shi’i south. Indeed, the present Shi’i empowerment, the result of the defeat of the Ba’th regime at the hands of the international coalition and of the elections introduced by the occupying powers may lead in two diametrically opposed directions. It may lead to a new stable system that is not based on ruthless repression like that of Saddam Husayn’s but, rather, on a national pact. Alternatively, if Iraq breaks up violently, it can lead to bitter Shi’i infighting, followed by a radical Shi’i-Islamist rule over the south of the country and at least most of Baghdad. The result of the latter development is most likely to be that Iraq’s richest oil fields, rather than benefiting the Iraqi people, will fall under the control of the corrupt and radical regime of the Iranian mollahs. If violence is not quelled, Shi’i fundamentalist extremism may also spread into the large Shi’i minority populations of the Arab Gulf states. A spill over of the Iraqi chaos into the region threatens to destabilize the whole Persian Gulf, a region that is not only prosperous and reasonably stable but, also, where some 60% of all the world’s proven oil reserves are to be found.

For the Americans, Iraq represents a formidable challenge and dilemma. Presently every day the US armed forces are losing one or two soldiers and a few are wounded. Every day the American tax payer is spending on the war in Iraq around $250 million. All this is making Iraq into one of the post-cold war world’s greatest crises, if not the greatest one.  By the July 2008 some 30,000 US troops are likely to be withdrawn. And yet, for a few more years a substantial number of US troops will most likely still be stationed there. Furthermore: for many years political tensions, resulting with continued socio-economic strife, are very likely to plague Iraq. This will also keep the country as a Damocles Sword hanging over the Gulf and Middle East regions and their stability.

Resolving or, at least, blunting the ethnic and sectarian conflicts and stabilizing Iraq, turning it into a peaceful member of the Middle Eastern state system is a crucial and urgent mission for the US, the West and the Arab world alike. The team of the Center for Iraq Study believes that their research can make a useful contribution toward formulating a strategy in that respect.

The Need for In-Depth Political, Social and Cultural Analysis

From almost every point of view it is becoming obvious that in depth analysis of Iraqi politics, society and culture is essential in order to provide better understanding of Iraqi affairs to policy makers. A study of those aspects of Iraqi history that will enable decision makers to understand the relevance of this history to the present is essential as well.  Due to the background of its scholars the Center for Iraq Studies will be uniquely qualified to provide this kind of research and to evaluate contemporary developments in Iraqi politics, society and culture. 

The main issues on which the Fellows of the Center for Iraq Studies are focusing their research are the past and present of the Kurds, of the Shi’i community, its leaderships, organizations and grass roots, and the repercussions in the Sunni community of the loss of their hegemonic position in Iraq.  While some scholars of the Center are studying how tribal groups and shaykhs are functioning in the new post-Ba’th environment, others are concerned with the consequences for the Iraqi state and society of promoting the tribes.  Another aspect relevant to all three communities is the production and impact of culture:  how poets, novelists, playwrights, film producers and other producers of mass culture are affecting the public.  Furthermore, even realms like sports events, sports teams and similar recreational activities are taken into account and factored into the overall cultural-emotional tapestry.  The role of the Iraqi soccer team in resuscitating national unity and its victory in the Asian games is a case in point.

Last but not least: the Center’s scholars are also studying in depth the whole complex of the place of women and youth in society and politics.  Women’s role is central to the understanding of how a society is managing its social, cultural and economic affairs.
Within the upsurge of civil society activism, following the fall of the Ba‘th regime, many women became active in claiming their rights to participate in the rebuilding of their country. Soon, however, they found themselves caught between the objectives of competing factions, deprived of independent voice and victims of increasing violence.  As for youth, more than 50% of Iraq’s population today is under 25 years of age. Such a population is highly volatile and thus it presents a great challenge to any leadership. The tremendous popularity of the Mahdi Army among Shi’i young men and of the Islamist insurgents among the Sunnis are but two conspicuous examples. 

How can better analysis of politics, society and culture help the decision maker?

A few examples may demonstrate the value of such an analysis. The tension among Kurds between the younger generation, that is pushing for complete independence, and the older politicians and the middle class who are fully mindful of the risks involved in such a move deserves a thorough study. Understanding of these tensions, as well as the other sources of frustration of the young Kurdish generation could help American decision makers in their efforts to recruit those forces in society that can contribute to rational decision making and stability. This may help the US to avoid dissonance between American and Turkish interests in Iraq.  A better understanding of the socio-economic forces that support Muqtada Sadr and his Mahdi Army, as well as the young cleric’s leadership style, the sources of his influence and control, his theology and his strategic goals may prove crucial to anyone who wants to decide what can and should be done about him and his men.  In the same way an in-depth understanding of the forces that support Grand Ayat Allah Sistani, or the Hakim family, or al-Fadhilah, or al-Da’wa, or Iraqi Hizballah, or small messianic groups like Jund al-Islam, or tribal and other community leaders are likely to help smooth interaction with the Shi’i population. So far, there are only very few extensive studies of the tribes of Iraq (in 2007: Iraq Tribal Study – al-Anbar Governorate, by Global Risk for the US Department of Defense, studying three out of a few scores of Anbar tribes). There is need for much more. A study of the tribal system in all the Sunni areas, and of the Sunni political leadership, both in the countryside and in the capital, as well as the interconnections between the political leaders in parliament and their constituencies can help a great deal anyone who is looking for a way of reaching the Sunni grass roots and convincing them to accept a compromise reached by the politicians in Baghdad.  A study of the social, economic and cultural components that can reduce inter-communal hatreds and vengeance and strengthen the common Iraqi identity at the expense of factional, ethnic and sectarian ones may also serve as an important tool for anyone interested in building a stable Iraq. 

Better understanding the mutual historical suspicions between the three main communities will allow, for example, non-Iraqi diplomats who are trying to help pry loose the oil law that, for many months, has been caught between the rival factions in parliament. Likewise, a better understanding of mutual fears especially between Sunni and Shi’i Arabs will contribute to a more sensitive approach to the (so far) intractable issue of power-sharing. The Sunnis are afraid that the Shi’is will deny them any influence, especially in the security arena, and that they will introduce Iranian Revolutionary Guards (Pasdaran) officers into the heart of Iraq’s security establishment. The Shi’is for their part are wary of Sunni-Arab fifth column inside the new Iraqi security system.  All these fears are well-founded.  Here too the way to overcome them depends to a large extent on understanding the historical experiences of both sides. 

The Center’s Activities

The Center for Iraq Studies will be operating in a number of ways. 

• The Center’s scholars will offer occasional papers analyzing the situation in various areas. The papers will deal with the present state of affairs and also which way the wind is blowing in the various communities, parties, militias and tribal groups in Iraq. The Center’s Fellows will also provide policy recommendations. 
• Requests may be submitted for the Center’s scholars to prepare in-depth studies of political, economic, social and cultural developments in Iraq.
• Depending on its financial resources the Center will encourage academic research through special prizes for exceptional MA and Ph.D. theses.
• The Center will convene Israeli and international conferences and workshops that will deal with Iraq and its immediate neighbors, sometimes also expanding research to the impact of events in Iraq on the wider Middle East arena and vice versa. 
• The Center will offer seminars and organize public lectures on Iraq and the Gulf arena for the general public as a contribution to society.
• The Center will have a web site that will serve to disseminate information and analysis regarding issues that are gaining only little or no media exposures but that we consider important. The information will come from a very large number of Iraq websites, most of which are not being reviewed today. The reliability of each site will be evaluated. Probably even more importantly: all Iraqi TV channels and al-Jazeerah in Arabuc will be scanned and a weekly report of their reporting will be made available. We hope this way to draw attention to developments and possibilities that are mostly or entirely “under the radar screen” of the public and decision makers.
• The Center’s scholars are already engaged in writing fully-fledged monographs on various aspects of Iraqi history and society. Dr. Zeidel is writing on the town of Tikrit in Iraqi history, between the late 19th century and 2003 with an epilogue 2003-2007. Dr. Efrati is completing her book on women’s status and struggle to gain equality in Iraq 1932-2007. Dr. Eppel is writing a book on the Kurds of Iraq and Prof. Baram is completing a book on mosque-state relations in Iraq under the Ba’th and beyond, 1968-2008.  All four fellows are also engaged in publishing articles in professional magazines and edited academic volumes mainly in the US and Britain. In 2008 the Center will publish an edited academic volume. “Iraq Past and Present”, the result of a large international conference held at the University of Haifa in March 2007. 
• The Center will cooperate with other research centers in Israel and abroad in organizing conferences and workshops and in conducting research. In Israel it will serve as a hub for all or most Israeli expertise on Iraq. In Israel cooperation will be especially extensive with the Iraq Study Group of the Harry S. Truman Institute at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, headed by Prof. Amnon Cohen and directed by Dr. Noga Efrati. Joint workshops will be held once a month in Haifa or Jerusalem and the results will be made public. When an Iraqi national or a Western intelligence analyst is presenting a study, upon request his/her name will be kept confidential but the study and the debate that follows will be made public. Occasionally when this is considered necessary the Chatham House regulations will be introduced: the discussion will be fully reported but not for attribution to individual participants. Outside of Israel the Center has established contacts with Iraqi scholars who are living inside and outside of Iraq. The Center will cooperate also with Western (mainly American, German and British) universities, research centers and individual scholars.

^ Top